A Closer Look at Falcon

Phillip Gajland; Jonas Janneck; Eike Kiltz

Paper 2024/1769

A Closer Look at Falcon

Phillip Gajland

, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy, Ruhr University Bochum

Jonas Janneck

, Ruhr University Bochum

Eike Kiltz

, Ruhr University Bochum

Abstract

Falcon is a winner of NIST's six-year post-quantum cryptography standardisation competition. Based on the celebrated full-domain-hash framework of Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan (GPV) (STOC'08), Falcon leverages NTRU lattices to achieve the most compact signatures among lattice-based schemes. Its security hinges on a Rényi divergence-based argument for Gaussian samplers, a core element of the scheme. However, the GPV proof, which uses statistical distance to argue closeness of distributions, fails when applied naively to Falcon due to parameter choices resulting in statistical distances as large as . Additional implementation-driven deviations from the GPV framework further invalidate the original proof, leaving Falcon without a security proof despite its selection for standardisation. This work takes a closer look at Falcon and demonstrates that introducing a few minor, conservative modifications allows for the first formal proof of the scheme in the random oracle model. At the heart of our analysis lies an adaptation of the GPV framework to work with the Rényi divergence, along with an optimised method for parameter selection under this measure. Unfortunately, our analysis shows that despite our modification of Falcon-512 and Falcon-1024 we do not achieve strong unforgeability for either scheme. For plain unforgeability we are able to show that our modifications to Falcon-512 barely satisfy the claimed 120-bit security target and for Falcon-1024 we confirm the claimed security level. As such we recommend revisiting Falcon and its parameters.

Note: Improved security bounds with new proof techniques and fixed errors.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
Keywords: Signatures Falcon GPV Renyi
Contact author(s): phillip gajland @ rub de
jonas janneck @ rub de
eike kiltz @ rub de
History: 2025-02-26: last of 2 revisions; 2024-10-30: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2024/1769
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1769,
      author = {Phillip Gajland and Jonas Janneck and Eike Kiltz},
      title = {A Closer Look at Falcon},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1769},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1769}
}