Paper 2024/1759

A Forgery Attack on a Code-based Signature Scheme

Ali Babaei, Sharif University of Technology
Taraneh Eghlidos, Sharif University of Technology
Abstract

With the advent of quantum computers, the security of cryptographic primitives, including digital signature schemes, has been compromised. To deal with this issue, some signature schemes have been introduced to resist against these computers. These schemes are known as post-quantum signature schemes. One group of these schemes is based on the hard problems of coding theory, called code-based cryptographic schemes. Several code-based signature schemes are inspired by the McEliece encryption scheme using three non-singular, parity-check, and permutation matrices as the only components of the private keys, and their product as the public key. In this paper, we focus on the analysis of a class of such signature schemes. For this purpose, we first prove that the linear relationships between the columns of the parity-check/generator matrix appear in the public key matrix, and by exploiting this feature we perform a forgery attack on one of the signature schemes of this class as an evidence. The complexity of this attack is of O(n^4).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
code-based signaturecode-based cryptographypost-quantum cryptographyscrambler matrixparity-check matrix
Contact author(s)
ali babaei199 @ sharif edu
teghlidos @ sharif edu
History
2024-10-30: approved
2024-10-28: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1759
License
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial
CC BY-NC

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1759,
      author = {Ali Babaei and Taraneh Eghlidos},
      title = {A Forgery Attack on a Code-based Signature Scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1759},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1759}
}
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