Paper 2024/1749
Revisiting the “improving the security of multi-party quantum key agreement with five- qubit Brown states”
Abstract
In 2018 Cai et al. proposed a multi-party quantum key agreement with five-qubit Brown states. They confirmed the security of their proposed scheme. However, Elhadad, Ahmed, et al. found the scheme cannot resist the collusion attack launched by legal participants. They suggested a modification and declared that their improved version is capable of resisting this type of attack. Nevertheless, after analysis, we found that the collusion attack still exists. Subsequently, we proposed a straightforward modification to prevent the attack. After analysis, we conclude that our modification meets the required security and collusion attack requirements, which are very important in the quantum key agreement scheme.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- quantum key agreementfive-qubit Brown statecollusion attackone-way hash functionquantum channel
- Contact author(s)
-
warrior1819150 @ gmail com
10769553 @ nhu edu tw
jschou @ nhu edu tw - History
- 2024-10-28: approved
- 2024-10-26: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1749
- License
-
CC BY-NC-SA
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1749, author = {Yu-Yuan Chou and Hsien-Hung Liu and Jue-Sam Chou}, title = {Revisiting the “improving the security of multi-party quantum key agreement with five- qubit Brown states”}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1749}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1749} }