Paper 2024/1698

Computational Analysis of Plausibly Post-Quantum-Secure Recursive Arguments of Knowledge

Dustin Ray, University of Washington Tacoma
Paulo L. Barreto, University of Washington Tacoma
Abstract

With the recent standardization of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, research efforts have largely remained centered on public key exchange and encryption schemes. Argument systems, which allow a party to efficiently argue the correctness of a computation, have received comparatively little attention regarding their quantum-resilient design. These computational integrity frameworks often rely on cryptographic assumptions, such as pairings or group operations, which are vulnerable to quantum attacks. In this work, we present a fully implemented post-quantum secure argument system that compresses unbounded computation into a constant-sized space. We present a fully implemented prover which can argue the truth of any size computation, and verifier which can verify correctness in constant time. This work shows an extension of utility for computational integrity statements into the quantum domain. We provide real-world performance metrics demonstrating that post-quantum secure argument systems not only exist but can outperform classical systems in both efficiency and scalability, making such systems an attractive choice for practical deployment.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Post-Quantum CryptographyRecursive Arguments of KnowledgeZero-Knowledge ProofsReed-Solomon Error-Correcting Codes
Contact author(s)
dustinray313 @ gmail com
pbarreto @ uw edu
History
2024-10-21: revised
2024-10-17: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1698
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1698,
      author = {Dustin Ray and Paulo L. Barreto},
      title = {Computational Analysis of Plausibly Post-Quantum-Secure Recursive Arguments of Knowledge},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1698},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1698}
}
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