Paper 2024/1610

Secret Sharing with Snitching

Abstract

We address the problem of detecting and punishing shareholder collusion in secret-sharing schemes. We do it in the recently proposed cryptographic model called individual cryptography (Dziembowski, Faust, and Lizurej, Crypto 2023), which assumes that there exist tasks that can be efficiently computed by a single machine but distributing this computation across multiple (mutually distrustful devices) is infeasible. Within this model, we introduce a novel primitive called secret sharing with snitching (SSS), in which each attempt to illegally reconstruct the shared secret $$ results in a proof that can be used to prove such misbehavior (and, e.g., financially penalize the cheater on a blockchain). This holds in a very strong sense, even if the shareholders attempt not to reconstruct the entire secret~$$ but only learn some partial information about it. Our notion also captures the attacks performed using multiparty computation protocols (MPCs), i.e., those where the malicious shareholders use MPCs to compute partial information on $$. The main idea of SSS is that any illegal reconstruction can be proven and punished, which suffices to discourage illegal secret reconstruction. Hence, our SSS scheme effectively prevents shareholders' collusion. We provide a basic definition of threshold ($$-out-of-$$) SSS. We then show how to construct it for $$, and later, we use this construction to build an SSS scheme for an arbitrary $$. In order to prove the security of our construction, we introduce a generalization of the random oracle model (Bellare, Rogaway, CCS 1993), which allows modelling hash evaluations made inside MPC.