Paper 2024/1609

Blaze: Fast SNARKs from Interleaved RAA Codes

Martijn Brehm, University of Amsterdam
Binyi Chen, Stanford University
Ben Fisch, Yale University
Nicolas Resch, University of Amsterdam
Ron D. Rothblum, Succinct
Hadas Zeilberger, Yale University
Abstract

In this work we construct a new and highly efficient multilinear polynomial commitment scheme (MLPCS) over binary fields, which we call \emph{Blaze}. Polynomial commitment schemes allow a server to commit to a large polynomial and later decommit to its evaluations. Such schemes have emerged as a key component in recent efficient SNARK constructions. Blaze has an extremely efficient prover, both asymptotically and concretely. The commitment is dominated by $8n$ field additions (i.e., XORs) and one Merkle tree computation. The evaluation proof generation is dominated by $6n$ additions and $5n$ multiplications over the field. The verifier runs in time $O_\lambda(\log^2(n))$. Concretely, for sufficiently large message sizes, the prover is faster than all prior schemes except for Brakedown (Golovnev et al., Crypto 2023), but offers significantly smaller proofs than the latter. The scheme is obtained by combining two ingredients: 1. Building on the code-switching technique (Ron-Zewi and Rothblum, JACM 2024), we show how to compose any error-correcting code together with an interactive oracle proof of proximity (IOPP) underlying existing MLPCS constructions, into a new MLPCS. The new MLPCS inherits its proving time from the code's encoding time, and its verification complexity from the underlying MLPCS. The composition is distinctive in that it is done purely on the information-theoretic side. 2. We apply the above methodology using an extremely efficient error-correcting code known as the Repeat-Accumulate-Accumulate (RAA) code. We give new asymptotic and concrete bounds, which demonstrate that (for sufficiently large message sizes) this code has a better encoding time vs. distance tradeoff than previous linear-time encodable codes that were considered in the literature.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
PCSSNARKsRAA codes
Contact author(s)
m a brehm @ uva nl
binyi @ cs stanford edu
ben fisch @ yale edu
n a resch @ uva nl
rothblum @ gmail com
hadas zeilberger @ yale edu
History
2024-10-11: approved
2024-10-09: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1609
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1609,
      author = {Martijn Brehm and Binyi Chen and Ben Fisch and Nicolas Resch and Ron D. Rothblum and Hadas Zeilberger},
      title = {Blaze: Fast {SNARKs} from Interleaved {RAA} Codes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1609},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1609}
}
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