Paper 2024/1596

Secret Sharing with Publicly Verifiable Deletion

Jonathan Katz, Google (United States), University of Maryland, College Park
Ben Sela, University of Maryland, College Park
Abstract

Certified deletion, an inherently quantum capability, allows a party holding a quantum state to prove that they have deleted the information contained in that state. Bartusek and Raizes recently studied certified deletion in the context of secret sharing schemes, and showed constructions with privately verifiable proofs of deletion that can be verified only by the dealer who generated the shares. We give two constructions of secret sharing schemes with publicly verifiable certified deletion. Our first construction is based on the post-quantum security of the LWE problem, and each share requires a number of qubits that is linear in the size of an underlying classical secret sharing scheme for the same set of authorized parties. Our second construction is based on a more general assumption—the existence of post quantum one-way functions— but requires an asymptotically larger number of qubits relative to the share size of the underlying classical scheme.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Contact author(s)
jkatz2 @ gmail com
benjsela @ cs umd edu
History
2024-10-09: approved
2024-10-08: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1596
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1596,
      author = {Jonathan Katz and Ben Sela},
      title = {Secret Sharing with Publicly Verifiable Deletion},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1596},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1596}
}
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