Paper 2024/157

Delphi: sharing assessments of cryptographic assumptions

Jeroen van de Graaf, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, ZKM Research
Arjen K. Lenstra, None
Abstract

Almost all practical cryptographic protocols are based on computational or ad-hoc assumptions. Assessing the strengths of these assumptions is therefore a key factor in evaluating the risks of the systems using them. As a service to (and by) cryptographic researchers and practitioners, we developed Delphi, an online questionnaire to document researchers' opinions and beliefs about the strengths of the most important assumptions. All responses received will be made accessible on our website, ideally non-anonymous (but depending on the contributor's preference). We also intend to consolidate these responses and publish the results. We believe this effort will be of great value when deciding which cryptographic primitives to keep or start using.

Note: Minor changes.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
computational assumptionscryptographic assumptions
Contact author(s)
jeroen g @ zkm io
History
2024-02-06: revised
2024-02-02: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/157
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/157,
      author = {Jeroen van de Graaf and Arjen K. Lenstra},
      title = {Delphi: sharing assessments of cryptographic assumptions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/157},
      year = {2024},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/157}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/157}
}
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