Paper 2024/1554
Breaking, Repairing and Enhancing XCBv2 into the Tweakable Enciphering Mode GEM
Abstract
Tweakable enciphering modes (TEMs) provide security in a variety of storage and space-critical applications like disk and file-based encryption, and packet-based communication protocols, among others. XCB-AES (known as XCBv2) is specified in the IEEE 1619.2 standard for encryption of sector-oriented storage media and it comes with a proof of security for block-aligned input messages.
In this work, we demonstrate the
Note: Revised the text in response to Wang et al.'s recent work (How to Recover the Full Plaintext of XCB, https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1527) and included a discussion in Appendix E, where we -- 1) present a generalized version of their attack 2 to improve its strength from breaking the STPRP security to even breaking the basic SPRP security of all targeted XCB variants. 2) discuss the relation between this generalized attack and our shared difference attack. 3) apply the generalized attack to XCBv3 (a variant of XCBv1) to point out the exact flaw. 4) clarify that GEM mode remains unaffected by these attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- tweakable enciphering modesVIL-STPRPXCBv2HCIIEEE 1619.2disk-sector encryptionGCTRSoCTR
- Contact author(s)
-
amitsingh bhati @ esat kuleuven be
michiel verbauwhede @ esat kuleuven be
elena andreeva @ tuwien ac at - History
- 2024-10-12: last of 3 revisions
- 2024-10-03: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1554
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1554, author = {Amit Singh Bhati and Michiel Verbauwhede and Elena Andreeva}, title = {Breaking, Repairing and Enhancing {XCBv2} into the Tweakable Enciphering Mode {GEM}}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1554}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1554} }