Paper 2024/1551
SNARKs for Virtual Machines are Non-Malleable
Abstract
Cryptographic proof systems have a plethora of applications: from building other cryptographic tools (e.g., malicious security for MPC protocols) to concrete settings such as private transactions or rollups. In several settings it is important for proof systems to be non-malleable: an adversary should not to be able to modify a proof they have observed into another for a statement for which they do not know the witness.
Proof systems that have been deployed in practice should arguably satisfy this notion: it is crucial in settings such as transaction systems and in order to securely compose proofs with other cryptographic protocols. As a consequence, results on non-malleability should keep up with designs of proofs being deployed.
Recently, Arun et al. proposed
Metadata
- Available format(s)
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PDF
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Contact author(s)
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binarywhalesinternaryseas @ gmail com
faonio @ eurecom fr
russol @ eurecom fr - History
- 2024-10-04: approved
- 2024-10-03: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1551
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1551, author = {Matteo Campanelli and Antonio Faonio and Luigi Russo}, title = {{SNARKs} for Virtual Machines are Non-Malleable}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1551}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1551} }