Paper 2024/1551

SNARKs for Virtual Machines are Non-Malleable

Matteo Campanelli
Antonio Faonio, EURECOM
Luigi Russo, EURECOM
Abstract

Cryptographic proof systems have a plethora of applications: from building other cryptographic tools (e.g., malicious security for MPC protocols) to concrete settings such as private transactions or rollups. In several settings it is important for proof systems to be non-malleable: an adversary should not to be able to modify a proof they have observed into another for a statement for which they do not know the witness. Proof systems that have been deployed in practice should arguably satisfy this notion: it is crucial in settings such as transaction systems and in order to securely compose proofs with other cryptographic protocols. As a consequence, results on non-malleability should keep up with designs of proofs being deployed. Recently, Arun et al. proposed $\mathsf{Jolt}$ (Eurocrypt 2024), arguably the first efficient proof system whose architecture is based on the lookup singularity approach (Barry Whitehat, 2022). This approach consists in representing a general computation as a series of table lookups. The final result is a SNARK for a Virtual Machine execution (or SNARK VM). Both SNARK VMs and lookup-singularity SNARKs are architectures with enormous potential and will probably be adopted more and more in the next years (and they already are). As of today, however, there is no literature regarding the non-malleability of SNARK VMs. The goal of this work is to fill this gap by providing both concrete non-malleability results and a set of technical tools for a more general study of SNARK VMs security (as well as "modular" SNARKs in general). As a concrete result, we study the non-malleability of (an idealized version of) $\mathsf{Jolt}$ and its fundamental building block, the lookup argument $\mathsf{Lasso}$. While connecting our new result on the non-malleability of $\mathsf{Lasso}$ to that of $\mathsf{Jolt}$, we develop a set of tools that enable the composition of non-malleable SNARKs. We believe this toolbox to be valuable in its own right.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint.
Contact author(s)
binarywhalesinternaryseas @ gmail com
faonio @ eurecom fr
russol @ eurecom fr
History
2024-10-04: approved
2024-10-03: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1551
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1551,
      author = {Matteo Campanelli and Antonio Faonio and Luigi Russo},
      title = {{SNARKs} for Virtual Machines are Non-Malleable},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1551},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1551}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.