Paper 2024/1530

Folding Schemes with Privacy Preserving Selective Verification

Joan Boyar, University of Southern Denmark
Simon Erfurth, University of Southern Denmark
Abstract

Folding schemes are an exciting new primitive, transforming the task of performing multiple zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge for a relation into performing just one zero-knowledge proof, for the same relation, and a number of cheap inclusion-proofs. Recently, folding schemes have been used to amortize the cost associated with proving different statements to multiple distinct verifiers, which has various applications. We observe that for these uses, leaking information about the statements folded together can be problematic, yet this happens with previous constructions. Towards resolving this issue, we give a natural definition of privacy preserving folding schemes, and what security they should offer. To construct privacy preserving folding schemes, we first define a statement hiders, a primitive which might be of independent interest. In a nutshell, a statement hider hides an instance of a relation as a new instance in the same relation. The new instance is in the relation if and only if the initial instance is. With this building block, we can utilize existing folding schemes to construct a privacy preserving folding scheme, by first hiding each of the statements. Folding schemes allow verifying that a statement was folded into another statement, while statement hiders allow verifying that a statement was hidden as another statement.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
folding schemesSNARKsdelegation of computation
Contact author(s)
joan @ imada sdu dk
simon @ serfurth dk
History
2024-10-04: approved
2024-09-30: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1530
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1530,
      author = {Joan Boyar and Simon Erfurth},
      title = {Folding Schemes with Privacy Preserving Selective Verification},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1530},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1530}
}
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