Paper 2024/1495
Lattice-Based Vulnerabilities in Lee Metric Post-Quantum Cryptosystems
, University of St. Gallen, Quantinuum, University of St. Gallen, Monash University, University of St. GallenAbstract
Post-quantum cryptography has gained attention due to the need for secure cryptographic systems in the face of quantum computing. Code-based and lattice-based cryptography are two promi- nent approaches, both heavily studied within the NIST standardization project. Code-based cryptography—most prominently exemplified by the McEliece cryptosystem—is based on the hardness of decoding random linear error-correcting codes. Despite the McEliece cryptosystem having been unbroken for several decades, it suffers from large key sizes, which has led to exploring variants using metrics than the Hamming metric, such as the Lee metric. This alternative metric may allow for smaller key sizes, but requires further analysis for potential vulnerabilities to lattice- based attack techniques. In this paper, we consider a generic Lee met- ric based McEliece type cryptosystem and evaluate its security against lattice-based attacks.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- code-based cryptographyLee metricHamming metriclattice-based cryptographyl1-norml2-norm
- Contact author(s)
-
anna-lena horlemann @ unisg ch
karan khathuria @ quantinuum com
marc newman @ unisg ch
amin sakzad @ monash edu
carlos velacabello @ unisg ch - History
- 2024-09-30: approved
- 2024-09-24: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1495
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1495,
author = {Anna-Lena Horlemann and Karan Khathuria and Marc Newman and Amin Sakzad and Carlos Vela Cabello},
title = {Lattice-Based Vulnerabilities in Lee Metric Post-Quantum Cryptosystems},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1495},
year = {2024},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1495}
}
