Paper 2024/1495

Lattice-Based Vulnerabilities in Lee Metric Post-Quantum Cryptosystems

Anna-Lena Horlemann, University of St. Gallen
Karan Khathuria, Quantinuum
Marc Newman, University of St. Gallen
Amin Sakzad, Monash University
Carlos Vela Cabello, University of St. Gallen
Abstract

Post-quantum cryptography has gained attention due to the need for secure cryptographic systems in the face of quantum computing. Code-based and lattice-based cryptography are two promi- nent approaches, both heavily studied within the NIST standardization project. Code-based cryptography—most prominently exemplified by the McEliece cryptosystem—is based on the hardness of decoding random linear error-correcting codes. Despite the McEliece cryptosystem having been unbroken for several decades, it suffers from large key sizes, which has led to exploring variants using metrics than the Hamming metric, such as the Lee metric. This alternative metric may allow for smaller key sizes, but requires further analysis for potential vulnerabilities to lattice- based attack techniques. In this paper, we consider a generic Lee met- ric based McEliece type cryptosystem and evaluate its security against lattice-based attacks.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
code-based cryptographyLee metricHamming metriclattice-based cryptographyl1-norml2-norm
Contact author(s)
anna-lena horlemann @ unisg ch
karan khathuria @ quantinuum com
marc newman @ unisg ch
amin sakzad @ monash edu
carlos velacabello @ unisg ch
History
2024-10-15: revised
2024-09-24: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1495
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1495,
      author = {Anna-Lena Horlemann and Karan Khathuria and Marc Newman and Amin Sakzad and Carlos Vela Cabello},
      title = {Lattice-Based Vulnerabilities in Lee Metric Post-Quantum Cryptosystems},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1495},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1495}
}
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