Paper 2024/1467
P2C2T: Preserving the Privacy of Cross-Chain Transfer
Abstract
Blockchain-enabled digital currency systems have typically operated in isolation, lacking necessary mechanisms for seamless interconnection. Consequently, transferring assets across distinct currency systems remains a complex challenge, with existing schemes often falling short in ensuring security, privacy, and practicality. This paper proposes P2C2T -- a privacy-preserving cross-chain transfer scheme. It is the first scheme to address atomicity, unlinkability, indistinguishability, non-collateralization, and required functionalities across diverse currency systems. P2C2T is based on \textit{threshold anonymous atomic locks} (TA$^2$L), also proposed by us, serving as the cornerstone for guaranteeing atomic cross-chain transfer while obscuring the payment relationships between users. By combining TA$^2$L with \textit{verifiable timed discrete logarithm} schemes, P2C2T renders cross-chain transactions indistinguishable from regular intra-chain ones. Notably, P2C2T eliminates the collateralization of senders and imposes minimal requirements on underlying blockchains, specifically on the ability to verify signatures. We substantiate the security of TA$^2$L based on a proposed cryptographic notion called \textit{threshold blind conditional signatures} and demonstrate the security of P2C2T through necessary proofs. Additionally, we compare the performance of P2C2T with an existing scheme that has properties closest to P2C2T. The comparison reveals that P2C2T reduces overhead by at least $85.488\%$ in terms of running time, communication cost, and storage cost when completing a cross-chain transfer. We further conduct cross-chain transfers and intra-chain payments using the Bitcoin testnet and Litecoin testnet to illustrate the privacy and practicality of P2C2T.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. IEEE S&P 2025
- Keywords
- cross-chain transferatomicityunlinkabilityindistinguishabilitynon-collateralizationsignature verification
- Contact author(s)
-
happyafrog @ 163 com
zyan @ xidian edu cn
ltyang @ ieee org
bertino @ purdue edu - History
- 2024-09-21: approved
- 2024-09-19: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1467
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1467, author = {Panpan Han and Zheng Yan and Laurence T. Yang and Elisa Bertino}, title = {{P2C2T}: Preserving the Privacy of Cross-Chain Transfer}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1467}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1467} }