Paper 2024/1440

Trojan Insertion versus Layout Defenses for Modern ICs: Red-versus-Blue Teaming in a Competitive Community Effort

Johann Knechtel, New York University Abu Dhabi
Mohammad Eslami, Tallinn University of Technology
Peng Zou, Fudan University
Min Wei, Fudan University
Xingyu Tong, Fudan University
Binggang Qiu, Fudan University
Zhijie Cai, Fudan University
Guohao Chen, Fudan University
Benchao Zhu, Fudan University
Jiawei Li, Fudan University
Jun Yu, Fudan University
Jianli Chen, Fudan University
Chun-Wei Chiu, National Tsing Hua University
Min-Feng Hsieh, National Tsing Hua University
Chia-Hsiu Ou, National Tsing Hua University
Ting-Chi Wang, National Tsing Hua University
Bangqi Fu, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Qijing Wang, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Yang Sun, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Qin Luo, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Anthony W. H. Lau, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Fangzhou Wang, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Evangeline F. Y. Young, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Shunyang Bi, Xidian University
Guangxin Guo, Xidian University
Haonan Wu, Xidian University
Zhengguang Tang, Xidian University
Hailong You, Xidian University
Cong Li, Xidian University
Ramesh Karri, New York University
Ozgur Sinanoglu, New York University Abu Dhabi
Samuel Pagliarini, Tallinn University of Technology, Carnegie Mellon University
Abstract

Hardware Trojans (HTs) are a longstanding threat to secure computation. Among different threat models, it is the fabrication-time insertion of additional malicious logic directly into the layout of integrated circuits (ICs) that constitutes the most versatile, yet challenging scenario, for both attackers and defenders. Here, we present a large-scale, first-of-its-kind community effort through red-versus-blue teaming that thoroughly explores this threat. Four independently competing blue teams of 23 IC designers in total had to analyze and fix vulnerabilities of representative IC layouts, whereas a red team of 3 experts in hardware security and IC design continuously pushed the boundaries of these defense efforts through different HTs and novel insertion techniques. Importantly, we find that, despite the blue teams’ commendable efforts, even highly-optimized layouts retained at least some exploitable vulnerabilities. Our effort follows a real-world setting for a modern 7nm technology node and industry-grade tooling for IC design, all embedded into a fully-automated and extensible benchmarking framework. To ensure the relevance of this work, strict rules that adhere to real-world requirements for IC design and manufacturing were postulated by the organizers. For example, not a single violation for timing and design-rule checks were allowed for defense techniques. Besides, in an advancement over prior art, neither red nor blue teams were allowed to use any so-called fillers and spares for trivial attack or defense approaches. Finally, we release all methods and artifacts: the representative IC layouts and HTs, the devised attack and defense techniques, the evaluation metrics and setup, the technology setup and commercial-grade reference flow for IC design, the encompassing benchmarking framework, and all best results. This full release enables the community to continue exploring this important challenge for hardware security, in particular to focus on the urgent need for further advancements in defense strategies.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Published by the IACR in TCHES 2025
DOI
10.46586/tches.v2025.i1.37-77
Keywords
Hardware SecurityTrojansIC DesignRed-versus-Blue Teaming
Contact author(s)
johann @ nyu edu
History
2024-12-12: revised
2024-09-15: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1440
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1440,
      author = {Johann Knechtel and Mohammad Eslami and Peng Zou and Min Wei and Xingyu Tong and Binggang Qiu and Zhijie Cai and Guohao Chen and Benchao Zhu and Jiawei Li and Jun Yu and Jianli Chen and Chun-Wei Chiu and Min-Feng Hsieh and Chia-Hsiu Ou and Ting-Chi Wang and Bangqi Fu and Qijing Wang and Yang Sun and Qin Luo and Anthony W. H. Lau and Fangzhou Wang and Evangeline F. Y. Young and Shunyang Bi and Guangxin Guo and Haonan Wu and Zhengguang Tang and Hailong You and Cong Li and Ramesh Karri and Ozgur Sinanoglu and Samuel Pagliarini},
      title = {Trojan Insertion versus Layout Defenses for Modern {ICs}: Red-versus-Blue Teaming in a Competitive Community Effort},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1440},
      year = {2024},
      doi = {10.46586/tches.v2025.i1.37-77},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1440}
}
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