Paper 2024/1423

Towards package opening detection at power-up by monitoring thermal dissipation

Julien Toulemont, University of Montpellier
Geoffrey Chancel, University of Montpellier
Fréderick Mailly, University of Montpellier
Philippe Maurine, University of Montpellier
Pascal Nouet, University of Montpellier
Abstract

Among the various threats to secure ICs, many are semi-invasive in the sense that their application requires the removal of the package to gain access to either the front or back of the target IC. Despite this stringent application requirements, little attention is paid to embedded techniques aiming at checking the package's integrity. This paper explores the feasibility of verifying the package integrity of microcontrollers by examining their thermal dissipation capability.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. Cascade
Keywords
Securityhardwarefault attacksreverse-engineeringcountermeasurethermal dissipation monitoring
Contact author(s)
gchancel @ lirmm fr
frederick mailly @ umontpellier fr
pmaurine @ lirmm fr
nouet @ lirmm fr
History
2024-09-11: approved
2024-09-11: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1423
License
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial
CC BY-NC

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1423,
      author = {Julien Toulemont and Geoffrey Chancel and Fréderick Mailly and Philippe Maurine and Pascal Nouet},
      title = {Towards package opening detection at power-up by monitoring thermal dissipation},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1423},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1423}
}
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