Cache Timing Leakages in Zero-Knowledge Protocols

Shibam Mukherjee; Christian Rechberger; Markus Schofnegger

Paper 2024/1390

Cache Timing Leakages in Zero-Knowledge Protocols

Shibam Mukherjee, Graz University of Technology, Know Center

Christian Rechberger, Graz University of Technology, TACEO

Markus Schofnegger, Horizen Labs

Abstract

The area of modern zero-knowledge proof systems has seen a significant rise in popularity over the last couple of years, with new techniques and optimized constructions emerging on a regular basis. As the field matures, the aspect of implementation attacks becomes more relevant, however side-channel attacks on zero-knowledge proof systems have seen surprisingly little treatment so far. In this paper we give an overview of potential attack vectors and show that some of the underlying finite field libraries, and implementations of heavily used components like hash functions, are vulnerable w.r.t. cache attacks on CPUs. On the positive side, we demonstrate that the computational overhead to protect against these attacks is relatively small.

Note: - 05.09.2024 - 1) Affiliation typo fixed 2) Fixed acknowledgement copy-paste error 3) New acknowledgement added 3) Disclosure added

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info: Preprint.
Keywords: zero knowledge cache timing side channel leakage attack
Contact author(s): shibam mukherjee @ iaik tugraz at
christian rechberger @ tugraz at
markus schofnegger @ gmail com
History: 2024-09-05: revised; 2024-09-04: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2024/1390
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1390,
      author = {Shibam Mukherjee and Christian Rechberger and Markus Schofnegger},
      title = {Cache Timing Leakages in Zero-Knowledge Protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1390},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1390}
}