Paper 2024/1339

Comprehensive Robustness Analysis of GCM, CCM, and OCB3

Akiko Inoue, NEC (Japan)
Tetsu Iwata, Nagoya University
Kazuhiko Minematsu, NEC (Japan), Yokohama National University
Abstract

Clarifying the robustness of authenticated encryption (AE) schemes, such as security under nonce misuse or Release of Unverified Plaintext (RUP), is critically important due to the extensive use of AEs in real-world applications. We present a comprehensive analysis of the robustness of well-known standards, namely GCM, CCM, and OCB3. Despite many existing studies, we uncovered several robustness properties for them that were not known in the literature. In particular, we show that both GCM and CCM maintain authenticity under RUP. Moreover, CCM keeps this feature even if a nonce is misused. Together with existing analysis, our work gives a complete picture of the robustness of these standards for the first time. Our results also imply several new robust AE schemes based on GCM and CCM.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Authenticated encryptionRobustnessGCMCCMOCB3
Contact author(s)
a_inoue @ nec com
tetsu iwata @ nagoya-u jp
k-minematsu @ nec com
History
2024-08-30: approved
2024-08-27: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1339
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1339,
      author = {Akiko Inoue and Tetsu Iwata and Kazuhiko Minematsu},
      title = {Comprehensive Robustness Analysis of {GCM}, {CCM}, and {OCB3}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1339},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1339}
}
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