Paper 2024/1309
R-STELLAR: A Resilient Synthesizable Signature Attenuation SCA Protection on AES-256 with built-in Attack-on-Countermeasure Detection
Abstract
Side-channel attacks (SCAs) remain a significant threat to the security of cryptographic systems in modern embedded devices. Even mathematically secure cryptographic algorithms, when implemented in hardware, inadvertently leak information through physical side-channel signatures such as power consumption, electromagnetic (EM) radiation, light emissions, and acoustic emanations. Exploiting these side channels significantly reduces the attacker’s search space. In recent years, physical countermeasures have significantly increased the minimum traces-to-disclosure (MTD) to 1 billion. Among them, signature attenuation is the first method to achieve this mark. Signature attenuation often relies on analog techniques, and digital signature attenuation reduces MTD to 20 million, requiring additional methods for high resilience. We focus on improving the digital signature attenuation by an order of magnitude (MTD 200M).
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- side-channel attackscorrelational power analysisEM leakageAES-256SynthesizableTVLAgeneric countermeasure
- Contact author(s)
-
ghosh69 @ purdue edu
seo60 @ purdue edu
debayandas @ iisc ac in
santosh ghosh @ gmail com
shreyas @ purdue edu - History
- 2024-08-23: approved
- 2024-08-21: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1309
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1309, author = {Archisman Ghosh and Dong-Hyun Seo and Debayan Das and Santosh Ghosh and Shreyas Sen}, title = {R-{STELLAR}: A Resilient Synthesizable Signature Attenuation {SCA} Protection on {AES}-256 with built-in Attack-on-Countermeasure Detection}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1309}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1309} }