Paper 2024/1309

R-STELLAR: A Resilient Synthesizable Signature Attenuation SCA Protection on AES-256 with built-in Attack-on-Countermeasure Detection

Archisman Ghosh, Purdue University West Lafayette
Dong-Hyun Seo, Purdue University West Lafayette
Debayan Das, Indian Institute of Science Bangalore
Santosh Ghosh
Shreyas Sen, Purdue University West Lafayette
Abstract

Side-channel attacks (SCAs) remain a significant threat to the security of cryptographic systems in modern embedded devices. Even mathematically secure cryptographic algorithms, when implemented in hardware, inadvertently leak information through physical side-channel signatures such as power consumption, electromagnetic (EM) radiation, light emissions, and acoustic emanations. Exploiting these side channels significantly reduces the attacker’s search space. In recent years, physical countermeasures have significantly increased the minimum traces-to-disclosure (MTD) to 1 billion. Among them, signature attenuation is the first method to achieve this mark. Signature attenuation often relies on analog techniques, and digital signature attenuation reduces MTD to 20 million, requiring additional methods for high resilience. We focus on improving the digital signature attenuation by an order of magnitude (MTD 200M).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
side-channel attackscorrelational power analysisEM leakageAES-256SynthesizableTVLAgeneric countermeasure
Contact author(s)
ghosh69 @ purdue edu
seo60 @ purdue edu
debayandas @ iisc ac in
santosh ghosh @ gmail com
shreyas @ purdue edu
History
2024-08-23: approved
2024-08-21: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1309
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1309,
      author = {Archisman Ghosh and Dong-Hyun Seo and Debayan Das and Santosh Ghosh and Shreyas Sen},
      title = {R-{STELLAR}: A Resilient Synthesizable Signature Attenuation {SCA} Protection on {AES}-256 with built-in Attack-on-Countermeasure Detection},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1309},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1309}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.