Paper 2024/1304
Improved Algebraic Attacks on Round-Reduced LowMC with Single-Data Complexity
, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of SciencesAbstract
Recently, Picnic3 has introduced several alternative LowMC instances, which prompts the cryptanalysis competition for LowMC. In this paper, we provide new solutions to the competition with full S-box layers under single-data complexity. First, we present a new guess-and-determine attack framework that achieves the best trade-off in complexity, while effectively enhancing two algorithms applicable to 2-round LowMC cryptanalysis. Next, we present a new meet-in-the-middle attack framework for 2-/3-round LowMC, which can gradually reduce the number of variables and narrow down the range of candidate keys in stages. As a result, our 3-stage MITM attacks have both lower time complexity and memory complexity than the best previous 2-round attacks proposed by Banik et al. at ASIACRYPT 2021, with memory reduced drastically by a factor of $ 2^{29.7} \sim 2^{70.4} $.
Note: Update for camera-ready version.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC) 2024
- Keywords
- LowMCPicnicAlgebraic attackMITMLow memory
- Contact author(s)
-
renxingwei @ iie ac cn
liyongqiang @ iie ac cn
wangmingsheng @ iie ac cn - History
- 2024-11-05: revised
- 2024-08-21: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1304
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1304,
author = {Xingwei Ren and Yongqiang Li and Mingsheng Wang},
title = {Improved Algebraic Attacks on Round-Reduced {LowMC} with Single-Data Complexity},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1304},
year = {2024},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1304}
}
