Paper 2024/111
A Novel Power Analysis Attack against CRYSTALS-Dilithium Implementation
Abstract
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) was proposed due to the potential threats quantum computer attacks against conventional public key cryptosystems, and four PQC algorithms besides CRYSTALS-Dilithium (Dilithium for short) have so far been selected for NIST standardization. However, the selected algorithms are still vulnerable to side-channel attacks in practice, and their physical security need to be further evaluated. This study introduces two efficient power analysis attacks, the optimized fast two-stage approach and the single-bit approach, aimed at reducing the key guess space in NTT polynomial multiplication on an STM32F405 device (ARM Cortex-M4 core). Our findings reveal that the optimized approach outperforms the conservative approach and the fast two-stage approach proposed in ICCD 2021 by factors of 519 and 88, respectively. Similarly, the single-bit approach demonstrates speedups of 365 and 62 times compared to these two approaches, respectively.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Side-Channel AttackCRYSTALS-DilithiumPost-Quantum CryptographyMontgomery ReductionNumber Theoretic Transform
- Contact author(s)
-
fengzhongren @ njust edu cn
liuyuejun @ njust edu cn
zhouyongbin @ njust edu cn
gaoyiwen @ njust edu cn
qiaozehua @ iie ac cn
wanghuaxin @ njust edu cn - History
- 2024-01-26: approved
- 2024-01-25: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/111
- License
-
CC BY-NC
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/111, author = {Yong Liu and Yuejun Liu and Yongbin Zhou and Yiwen Gao and Zehua Qiao and Huaxin Wang}, title = {A Novel Power Analysis Attack against {CRYSTALS}-Dilithium Implementation}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/111}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/111} }