Paper 2024/1092

Fusion Channel Attack with POI Learning Encoder

Xinyao Li, City University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen Research Institute
Xiwen Ren, Wuhan University
Ling Ning, Wuhan University
Changhai Ou, Wuhan University
Abstract

In order to challenge the security of cryptographic systems, Side-Channel Attacks exploit data leaks such as power consumption and electromagnetic emissions. Classic Side-Channel Attacks, which mainly focus on mono-channel data, fail to utilize the joint information of multi-channel data. However, previous studies of multi-channel attacks have often been limited in how they process and adapt to dynamic data. Furthermore, the different data types from various channels make it difficult to use them effectively. This study introduces the Fusion Channel Attack with POI Learning Encoder (FCA), which employs a set of POI Learning encoders that learn the inverse base transformation function family and project the data of each channel into a unified fusion latent space. Furthermore, our method introduces an optimal transport theory based metric for evaluating feature space fusion, which is used to assess the differences in feature spaces between channels. This model not only enhances the ability to process and interpret multi-source data, but also significantly improves the accuracy and applicability of SCAs in different environments.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Side Channel AttackMuti-Side AttackDeep Learning
Contact author(s)
1149275774 @ qq com
rxiwen @ whu edu cn
2907616355 @ qq com
ouchanghai @ whu edu cn
History
2024-07-05: approved
2024-07-04: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1092
License
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs
CC BY-NC-ND

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1092,
      author = {Xinyao Li and Xiwen Ren and Ling Ning and Changhai Ou},
      title = {Fusion Channel Attack with {POI} Learning Encoder},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/1092},
      year = {2024},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1092}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1092}
}
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