Paper 2024/1019

Exploiting Clock-Slew Dependent Variability in CMOS Digital Circuits Towards Power and EM SCA Resilience

Archisman Ghosh, Purdue University West Lafayette
Md. Abdur Rahman, Purdue University West Lafayette
Debayan Das, Indian Institute of Science Bangalore
Santosh Ghosh, Intel (United States)
Shreyas Sen, Purdue University West Lafayette
Abstract

Mathematically secured cryptographic implementations leak critical information in terms of power, EM emanations, etc. Several circuit-level countermeasures are proposed to hinder side channel leakage at the source. Circuit-level countermeasures (e.g., IVR, STELLAR, WDDL, etc) are often preferred as they are generic and have low overhead. They either dither the voltage randomly or attenuate the meaningful signature at $V_{DD}$ port. Although any digital implementation has two generic ports, namely clock and $V_{DD}$, circuit-level countermeasures primarily focus on $V_{DD}$ port, and countermeasures using the clock are mainly unexplored. System-level clock randomization is ineffective due to post-processing techniques. This work, for the first time, presents clock-based countermeasures by providing a controlled slew that exploits the inherent variability of digital circuits in terms of power consumption and transforms power/EM emanation into a complex function of data and slew. Due to this, minimum traces-to-disclosure (MTD) improves by 100$\times$ with respect to the unprotected one. Moreover, the slewed clock reduces the leaky frequency, and the clock randomization countermeasure is more effective as it becomes more difficult} to post-process in the frequency domain. Clock slew and randomization together have a cumulative effect(1800x) more than the multiplication of individual techniques (100x & 5x respectively). In brief, this paper presents a clock-level generic synthesizable countermeasure technique that improved the minimum-traces-to-disclosure (MTD) by 1800$\times$ and incurs only 11% area overhead, $<3\%$ power overhead (measured) and $<6\%$ performance overhead (measured). Moreover, this can be easily combined with other power-port-based mitigation techniques for enhanced security.

Note: This is under revision. It will be updated with publication details and an updated draft.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
side-channel attackscorrelational power analysisTVLAgeneric countermeasureclock-based countermeasureclock-slew
Contact author(s)
ghosh69 @ purdue edu
rahman88 @ purdue edu
shreyas @ purdue edu
History
2024-06-28: approved
2024-06-24: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1019
License
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs
CC BY-NC-ND

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1019,
      author = {Archisman Ghosh and Md. Abdur Rahman and Debayan Das and Santosh Ghosh and Shreyas Sen},
      title = {Exploiting Clock-Slew Dependent Variability in {CMOS} Digital Circuits Towards Power and {EM} {SCA} Resilience},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/1019},
      year = {2024},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1019}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1019}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.