Paper 2024/1003

zkVoting : Zero-knowledge proof based coercion-resistant and E2E verifiable e-voting system

Seongho Park, Hanyang University
Jaekyoung Choi, Zkrypto Inc.
Jihye Kim, Kookmin University
Hyunok Oh, Hanyang University
Abstract

We introduce zkVoting, a coercion-resistant e-voting system that utilizes a fake keys approach based on a novel nullifiable commitment scheme. This scheme allows voters to receive both real and fake commitment keys from a registrar. Each ballot includes this commitment, but only the tallier can efficiently discern the fake ballots, simplifying the tally process to and ensuring coercion resistance. also preserves voter anonymity by ensuring each ballot conceals the voter's identity. Additionally, by integrating zero-knowledge proofs, achieves end-to-end (E2E) verifiability. We formally prove its security and demonstrate its practicality for real-world applications, with a ballot casting time of 2.3 seconds and a tally time of 3.9 milliseconds per ballot.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
e-votingcoercion-resistanceE2E verifiabilitynullifiable commitment
Contact author(s)
seonghopark @ hanyang ac kr
cjk @ zkrypto com
jihyek @ kookmin ac kr
hoh @ hanyang ac kr
History
2024-06-21: approved
2024-06-21: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1003
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1003,
      author = {Seongho Park and Jaekyoung Choi and Jihye Kim and Hyunok Oh},
      title = {{zkVoting} : Zero-knowledge proof based coercion-resistant and {E2E} verifiable e-voting system},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1003},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1003}
}
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