Paper 2024/1003

zkVoting : Zero-knowledge proof based coercion-resistant and E2E verifiable e-voting system

Seongho Park, Hanyang University
Jaekyoung Choi, Zkrypto Inc.
Jihye Kim, Kookmin University
Hyunok Oh, Hanyang University
Abstract

We introduce ${zkVoting}$, a coercion-resistant e-voting system that utilizes a fake keys approach based on a novel nullifiable commitment scheme. This scheme allows voters to receive both real and fake commitment keys from a registrar. Each ballot includes this commitment, but only the tallier can efficiently discern the fake ballots, simplifying the tally process to $\mathcal{O}(n)$ and ensuring coercion resistance. ${zkVoting}$ also preserves voter anonymity by ensuring each ballot conceals the voter's identity. Additionally, by integrating zero-knowledge proofs, ${zkVoting}$ achieves end-to-end (E2E) verifiability. We formally prove its security and demonstrate its practicality for real-world applications, with a ballot casting time of 2.3 seconds and a tally time of 3.9 milliseconds per ballot.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
e-votingcoercion-resistanceE2E verifiabilitynullifiable commitment
Contact author(s)
seonghopark @ hanyang ac kr
cjk @ zkrypto com
jihyek @ kookmin ac kr
hoh @ hanyang ac kr
History
2024-06-21: approved
2024-06-21: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1003
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1003,
      author = {Seongho Park and Jaekyoung Choi and Jihye Kim and Hyunok Oh},
      title = {{zkVoting} : Zero-knowledge proof based coercion-resistant and {E2E} verifiable e-voting system},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1003},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1003}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.