Paper 2024/100

Fuzzy Extractors are Practical: Cryptographic Strength Key Derivation from the Iris

Amey Shukla, University of Connecticut
Luke Demarest, Gonzaga University
Benjamin Fuller, University of Connecticut
Sohaib Ahmad, University of Connecticut
Caleb Manicke, University of Connecticut
Alexander Russell, University of Connecticut
Sixia Chen, Adelphi University
Abstract

Despite decades of effort, a persistent chasm has existed between the theory and practice of device-level biometric authentication. Theoretical constructions can, in principle, provide biometric authentication with cryptographically secure public enrollment data. However, concrete implementations of these techniques have failed to provide security with real-world parameters. The result is that deployed authentication algorithms rely on data that overtly leaks private information about the biometric; thus systems rely on externalized security measures such as trusted execution environments. We close this chasm. We introduce a key derivation system with $105$ bits of entropy and a $92%$ true accept rate (TAR) for the iris. Our system advances 1) the feature extraction from the iris and 2) the fuzzy extractor used to derive keys. The fuzzy extractor builds on sample-then-lock (Canetti et al., Journal of Cryptology 2021). We (1) Introduce a new sampling method with a better trade-off between TAR and entropy when features have different quality, (2) Correct Canetti et al.'s main security proof, showing the minimum of min-entropy over subsets is the relevant security measure, and (3) Tighten Canetti et al.'s concrete analysis, nearly doubling security under reasonable assumptions. Our final feature extractor incorporates ideas from the new sampling method to produce features optimized for the sample-then-lock construction. The only statistical assumption needed to show security of our system is necessary: the accuracy of min-entropy estimation. At $105$ bits, our quantitative level of security is well above prior work. Simhadri et al. (ISC, 2019) report $32$ bits on the iris, but they have a bug in their analysis that reduces their strength. Zhang et al.'s (ePrint 2021/1559) system achieves $45$ bits on the face but assumes independence between biometrics and the used error-correcting code, an assumption that cannot be easily verified.

Note: Completely new results and new title to suit the 60 bit improvement in security over the last version.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. ACM CCS 2025
DOI
10.1145/3719027.3765098
Keywords
biometricsfuzzy extractorsirisfeature extractors
Contact author(s)
amey shukla @ uconn edu
onlylukejohnson @ gmail com
benjamin fuller @ uconn edu
sohaib ahmad @ uconn edu
caleb manicke @ uconn edu
acr @ uconn edu
schen @ adelphi edu
History
2025-09-03: last of 8 revisions
2024-01-22: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/100
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/100,
      author = {Amey Shukla and Luke Demarest and Benjamin Fuller and Sohaib Ahmad and Caleb Manicke and Alexander Russell and Sixia Chen},
      title = {Fuzzy Extractors are Practical: Cryptographic Strength Key Derivation from the Iris},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/100},
      year = {2024},
      doi = {10.1145/3719027.3765098},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/100}
}
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