Paper 2024/033

Security analysis and improvements on a semi-quantum electronic voting protocol

Qiu Shujing, Zhengzhou University of Light Industry
Xin Xiangjun, Zhengzhou University of Light Industry
Zheng Qian, Zhengzhou University of Light Industry
Li Chaoyang, Zhengzhou University of Light Industry
Li Fagen, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
Abstract

Recently, Qiu et al. proposed a semi-quantum voting scheme based on the ring signature (International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 60: 1550–1555(2021)), in which the signer and verifier only need measure the received particles with Z-basis and perform some classical simple encryption/decryption operations on the classical message. Although their scheme is very efficient, it cannot resist against the eavesdropping attacks and forgery attack. In this paper, first, the eavesdropping attacks on Qiu et al.’s scheme are proposed. Second, we show the forgery attack on their scheme. To overcome the security drawbacks of Qiu et al.’s protocol, the eavesdropping check technology should be considered.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Electronic voting schemeQuantum ring signatureEavesdropping attackForgery attack
Contact author(s)
3152576894 @ qq com
xin_xiang_jun @ 126 com
000zq000 @ 163 com
lichaoyang @ zzuli edu cn
fagenli @ uestc edu cn
History
2024-02-04: last of 7 revisions
2024-01-09: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/033
License
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial
CC BY-NC

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/033,
      author = {Qiu Shujing and Xin Xiangjun and Zheng Qian and Li Chaoyang and Li Fagen},
      title = {Security analysis and improvements on a semi-quantum electronic voting protocol},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2024/033},
      year = {2024},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/033}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/033}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.