Paper 2023/952
Limits on Adaptive Security for Attribute-Based Encryption
Abstract
This work addresses the long quest for proving full (adaptive) security for attribute-based encryption (ABE). We show that in order to prove full security in a black-box manner, the scheme must be ``irregular'' in the sense that it is impossible to ``validate'' secret keys to ascertain consistent decryption of ciphertexts. This extends a result of Lewko and Waters (Eurocrypt 2014) that was only applicable to straight-line proofs (without rewinding). Our work, therefore, establishes that it is impossible to circumvent the irregularity property using creative proof techniques, so long as the adversary is used in a black-box manner. As a consequence, our work provides an explanation as to why some lattice-based ABE schemes cannot be proven fully secure, even though no known adaptive attacks exist.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published by the IACR in TCC 2024
- Keywords
- Attribute-Based EncryptionAdaptive Security
- Contact author(s)
-
zvika brakerski @ weizmann ac il
medina stav @ gmail com - History
- 2024-09-19: last of 2 revisions
- 2023-06-18: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/952
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/952, author = {Zvika Brakerski and Stav Medina}, title = {Limits on Adaptive Security for Attribute-Based Encryption}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/952}, year = {2023}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/952} }