Paper 2023/926
Analysis of the security of the PSSI problem and cryptanalysis of the Durandal signature scheme
Abstract
We present a new attack against the PSSI problem, one of the three problems at the root of security of Durandal, an efficient rank metric code-based signature scheme with a public key size of 15 kB and a signature size of 4 kB, presented at EUROCRYPT'19. Our attack recovers the private key using a leakage of information coming from several signatures produced with the same key. Our approach is to combine pairs of signatures and perform Cramer-like formulas in order to build subspaces containing a secret element. We break all existing parameters of Durandal: the two published sets of parameters claiming a security of 128 bits are broken in respectively
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2023
- Keywords
- rank-metriccode-basedpost-quantumdigital signaturescryptanalysis
- Contact author(s)
- victor dyseryn_fostier @ unilim fr
- History
- 2023-06-14: approved
- 2023-06-13: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/926
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/926, author = {Nicolas Aragon and Victor Dyseryn and Philippe Gaborit}, title = {Analysis of the security of the {PSSI} problem and cryptanalysis of the Durandal signature scheme}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/926}, year = {2023}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/926} }