Paper 2023/851

Advancing the Meet-in-the-Filter Technique: Applications to CHAM and KATAN

Alex Biryukov, University of Luxembourg
Je Sen Teh, University of Luxembourg, Universiti Sains Malaysia
Aleksei Udovenko, University of Luxembourg
Abstract

Recently, Biryukov et al. presented a new technique for key recovery in differential cryptanalysis, called meet-in-the-filter (MiF). In this work, we develop theoretical and practical aspects of the technique, which helps understanding and simplifies application. In particular, we show bounds on MiF complexity and conditions when the MiF-enhanced attack may reach them. We present a method based on trail counting which allows to estimate filtering strength of involved rounds and perform consequent complexity analysis with pen and paper, compared to the computer-aided approach of the original work. Furthermore, we show how MiF can be combined with plaintext structures for linear key schedules, allowing to increase the number of attacked rounds or to reduce the data complexity. We illustrate our methods on block cipher families CHAM and KATAN and show best-to-date single-key differential attacks for these ciphers.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Published elsewhere. SAC 2022
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-58411-4_16
Keywords
Symmetric-keyDifferential cryptanalysisARXNLFSRCHAMKATAN
Contact author(s)
alex biryukov @ uni lu
jesen_teh @ usm my
aleksei @ affine group
History
2024-10-29: revised
2023-06-06: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/851
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/851,
      author = {Alex Biryukov and Je Sen Teh and Aleksei Udovenko},
      title = {Advancing the Meet-in-the-Filter Technique: Applications to {CHAM} and {KATAN}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/851},
      year = {2023},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-58411-4_16},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/851}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.