Paper 2023/831
Automated Generation of Masked Nonlinear Components: From Lookup Tables to Private Circuits
Abstract
Masking is considered to be an essential defense mechanism against side-channel attacks, but it is challenging to be adopted for hardware cryptographic implementations, especially for high security orders. Recently, Knichel et al. proposed an automated tool called AGEMA that enables the generation of masked implementations in hardware for arbitrary security orders using composable gadgets. This accelerates the construction and practical application of masking schemes. This article proposes a new automated tool named AGMNC that can generate masked nonlinear components with much better performance. The effectiveness of AGMNC is evaluated in several case studies. The evaluation results show a significant performance improvement, particularly for the first-order secure SKINNY S-box: saving 41$ \% $ area, 25$ \% $ latency, and 49$ \% $ dynamic power. We achieve such a good result by integrating three key techniques: a new composable AND-XOR gadget, an optimization strategy based on the latency asymmetry feature of the AND-XOR gadget, and an implementation optimization for synchronization. Besides, we use the formal verification tool SILVER and FPGA-based practical experiments to confirm the security of the masked implementations generated by AGMNC.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Side-Channel AnalysisMaskingComposable GadgetAGMNC
- Contact author(s)
-
lixuanwu @ mail sdu edu cn
yanhongfan @ sdu edu cn
bart preneel @ esat kuleuven be
weijiawang @ sdu edu cn
mqwang @ sdu edu cn - History
- 2023-08-14: revised
- 2023-06-05: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/831
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/831, author = {Lixuan Wu and Yanhong Fan and Bart Preneel and Weijia Wang and Meiqin Wang}, title = {Automated Generation of Masked Nonlinear Components: From Lookup Tables to Private Circuits}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/831}, year = {2023}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/831} }