Paper 2023/762

How to Design Fair Protocols in the Multi-Blockchain Setting

Abstract

Recently, there have been several proposals for secure computation with fair output delivery that require the use of a bulletin board abstraction (in addition to a trusted execution environment (TEE)). These proposals require all protocol participants to have read/write access to the bulletin board. These works envision the use of (public or permissioned) blockchains to implement the bulletin board abstractions. With the advent of consortium blockchains which place restrictions on who can read/write contents on the blockchain, it is not clear how to extend prior proposals to a setting where (1) not all parties have read/write access on a single consortium blockchain, and (2) not all parties prefer to post on a public blockchain. In this paper, we address the above by showing the first protocols for fair secure computation in the multi-blockchain setting. More concretely, in a $$-party setting where at most $$ parties are corrupt, our protocol for fair secure computation works as long as (1) $$ parties have access to a TEE (e.g., Intel SGX), and (2) each of the above $$ parties are on some blockchain with each of the other parties. Furthermore, only these $$ parties need write access on the blockchains. In an optimistic setting where parties behave honestly, our protocol runs completely off-chain.