Paper 2023/757
A Note on ``On the Design of Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol in Internet of Vehicles-Enabled Intelligent Transportation System''
Abstract
We remark that the key agreement scheme [IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol. 2021, 70(2): 1736--1751] fails to keep anonymity and untraceability, because the user $U_k$ needs to invoke the public key $PK_{U_j}$ to verify the signature generated by the user $U_j$. Since the public key is compulsively linked to the true identity $ID_{U_j}$ for authentication, any adversary can reveal the true identity by checking the signature.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Key agreementanonymitypublic keymutual authenticationintelligent transportation system
- Contact author(s)
-
caozhj @ shu edu cn
liulh @ shmtu edu cn - History
- 2023-05-30: approved
- 2023-05-25: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/757
- License
-
CC0
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/757, author = {Zhengjun Cao and Lihua Liu}, title = {A Note on ``On the Design of Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol in Internet of Vehicles-Enabled Intelligent Transportation System''}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/757}, year = {2023}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/757} }