Paper 2023/707

Concurrent Security of Anonymous Credentials Light, Revisited

Julia Kastner, ETH Zurich
Julian Loss, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Omar Renawi, CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Saarland University
Abstract

We revisit the concurrent security guarantees of the well-known Anonymous Credentials Light (ACL) scheme (Baldimtsi and Lysyanskaya, CCS'13). This scheme was originally proven secure when executed sequentially, and its concurrent security was left as an open problem. A later work of Benhamouda et al. (EUROCRYPT'21) gave an efficient attack on ACL when executed concurrently, seemingly resolving this question once and for all. In this work, we point out a subtle flaw in the attack of Benhamouda et al. on ACL and show, in spite of popular opinion, that it can be proven concurrently secure. Our modular proof in the algebraic group model uses an ID scheme as an intermediate step and leads to a major simplification of the complex security argument for Abe's Blind Signature scheme by Kastner et al. (PKC'22).

Note: In this revision, we address minor flaws in Lemma 3.5 and Claim D.1, and correct multiple typos throughout the paper.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. ACM CCS23
DOI
10.1145/3576915.3623184
Keywords
Blind SignaturesAnonymous CredentialsAlgebraic Group ModelConcurrent Security
Contact author(s)
julia kastner @ inf ethz ch
loss @ cispa de
omar renawi @ cispa de
History
2024-07-24: last of 3 revisions
2023-05-17: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/707
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/707,
      author = {Julia Kastner and Julian Loss and Omar Renawi},
      title = {Concurrent Security of Anonymous Credentials Light, Revisited},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/707},
      year = {2023},
      doi = {10.1145/3576915.3623184},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/707}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.