Paper 2023/705
Deniable Cryptosystems: Simpler Constructions and Achieving Leakage Resilience
Abstract
Deniable encryption (Canetti et al. CRYPTO ’97) is an intriguing primitive, which provides security guarantee against coercion by allowing a sender to convincingly open the ciphertext into a fake message. Despite the notable result by Sahai and Waters STOC ’14 and other efforts in functionality extension, all the deniable public key encryption (DPKE) schemes suffer from intolerable overhead due to the heavy building blocks, e.g., translucent sets or indistinguishability obfuscation. Besides, none of them considers the possible damage from leakage in the real world, obstructing these protocols from practical use. To fill the gap, in this work we first present a simple and generic approach of sender-DPKE from ciphertext-simulatable encryption, which can be instantiated with nearly all the common PKE schemes. The core of this design is a newly-designed framework for flipping a bit-string that offers inverse polynomial distinguishability. Then we theoretically expound and experimentally show how classic side-channel attacks (timing or simple power attacks), can help the coercer to break deniability, along with feasible countermeasures.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Deniable encryptionSimulatable encryptionSide-channel attacksLeakage resilience
- Contact author(s)
-
anzhy @ mail2 sysu edu cn
tianhb @ mail sysu edu cn
chench533 @ mail2 sysu edu cn
isszhfg @ mail sysu edu cn - History
- 2023-05-26: revised
- 2023-05-17: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/705
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/705,
author = {Zhiyuan An and Haibo Tian and Chao Chen and Fangguo Zhang},
title = {Deniable Cryptosystems: Simpler Constructions and Achieving Leakage Resilience},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/705},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/705}
}
