Paper 2023/637

Padding-based forgeries in the mode XOCB

Jean Liénardy, Royal Military Academy
Abstract

In this note, we identify a minor flaw in the design of the XOCB mode, presented at Eurocrypt '23. This vulnerability enables trivial tag forgeries and arises from the padding applied to messages. We examine the security proof and pinpoint the presence of the flaw within it. Furthermore, we propose a simple fix for this issue, drawing upon the features of OCB3, and discuss the implications of this modification on the proof of security.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Authenticated EncryptionForgeryOCBXOCB
Contact author(s)
jean lienardy @ mil be
History
2023-05-08: approved
2023-05-04: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/637
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/637,
      author = {Jean Liénardy},
      title = {Padding-based forgeries in the mode {XOCB}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/637},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/637}
}
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