Paper 2023/607
Security analysis of the Milenage-construction based on a PRF
Abstract
This paper analyses the security of the so-called Milenage construction, developed by ETSI SAGE, when it is based on a non-one-to-one pseudo-random function (PRF) rather than a one-to-one pseudo-random permutation (PRP). It is shown that Milenage based on an $n$-bit random function and producing $t$ $n$-bit outputs, is indistinguishable from a random $tn$-bit function up to $q = O(2^{n/2}/t)$ queries. We also extend the existing security proof for PRP-based Milenage due to Gilbert by generalising the model and incorporating the Milenage message authentication function in the proof.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- MilenagePRFsecurity proof
- Contact author(s)
-
alexander maximov @ ericsson com
matsna @ kth se - History
- 2023-07-14: revised
- 2023-04-28: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/607
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/607,
author = {Alexander Maximov and Mats Näslund},
title = {Security analysis of the Milenage-construction based on a {PRF}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/607},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/607}
}
