Paper 2023/559

Weakening Assumptions for Publicly-Verifiable Deletion

James Bartusek, University of California, Berkeley
Dakshita Khurana, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Giulio Malavolta, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy
Alexander Poremba, California Institute of Technology
Michael Walter, Ruhr-Universität Bochum

We develop a simple compiler that generically adds publicly-verifiable deletion to a variety of cryptosystems. Our compiler only makes use of one-way functions (or one-way state generators, if we allow the public verification key to be quantum). Previously, similar compilers either relied on the use of indistinguishability obfuscation (Bartusek et. al., ePrint:2023/265) or almost-regular one-way functions (Bartusek, Khurana and Poremba, arXiv:2303.08676).

Available format(s)
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in TCC 2023
quantum cryptographypublic-key encryptioncertified deletionpublic verification
Contact author(s)
bartusek james @ gmail com
dakshita @ illinois edu
giulio malavolta @ hotmail it
aporemba @ caltech edu
michael walter @ rub de
2023-10-16: revised
2023-04-19: received
See all versions
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {James Bartusek and Dakshita Khurana and Giulio Malavolta and Alexander Poremba and Michael Walter},
      title = {Weakening Assumptions for Publicly-Verifiable Deletion},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/559},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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