Paper 2023/536
Lightweight Asynchronous Verifiable Secret Sharing with Optimal Resilience
Abstract
We present new protocols for *Asynchronous Verifiable Secret Sharing* for Shamir (i.e., threshold $t<n$) sharing of secrets. Our protocols: * Use only "lightweight" cryptographic primitives, such as hash functions; * Can share secrets over rings such as $\mathbb{Z}_{p^k}$ as well as finite fields $\mathbb{F}_q$; * Provide *optimal resilience*, in the sense that they tolerate up to $t < n/3$ corruptions, where $n$ is the total number of parties; * Are *complete*, in the sense that they guarantee that if any honest party receives their share then all honest parties receive their shares; * Employ *batching* techniques, whereby a dealer shares many secrets in parallel, and achieves an amortized communication complexity that is linear in $n$, at least on the "happy path", where no party *provably* misbehaves.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published by the IACR in JOC 2024
- Keywords
- asynchronousvsssecret sharing
- Contact author(s)
-
victor @ shoup net
nigel @ zama ai - History
- 2024-03-07: last of 4 revisions
- 2023-04-13: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/536
- License
-
CC BY-NC-ND
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/536, author = {Victor Shoup and Nigel P. Smart}, title = {Lightweight Asynchronous Verifiable Secret Sharing with Optimal Resilience}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/536}, year = {2023}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/536} }