Paper 2023/477

Separations between simulation-based and simulation-free formulations of security for public key encryption

Yodai Watanabe, University of Aizu
Abstract

Simulation-based formulation of security enables us to naturally capture our intuition for security. However, since the simulation-based formulation is rather complicated, it is convenient to consider alternative simulation-free formulations which are easy to manipulate but can be employed to give the same security as the simulation-based one. So far the indistinguishability-based and comparison-based formulations have been introduced as such ones. Regarding the security for public key encryption, while these three formulations are shown equivalent in most settings, some relations among these formulations of non-malleability under the valid ciphertext condition, in which an adversary fails if it outputs an invalid ciphertext, remain open. This work aims to help to consider the appropriateness of the formulations of security by clarifying the above open relations among the formulations of non-malleable encryption.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Public key encryptionNon-malleabilityRelation among security notions
Contact author(s)
yodai @ u-aizu ac jp
History
2025-05-28: last of 2 revisions
2023-04-02: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/477
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/477,
      author = {Yodai Watanabe},
      title = {Separations between simulation-based and simulation-free formulations of security for public key encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/477},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/477}
}
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