Paper 2023/379

Asymmetric Quantum Secure Multi-Party Computation With Weak Clients Against Dishonest Majority

Theodoros Kapourniotis, University of Warwick
Elham Kashefi, Sorbonne University, University of Edinburgh
Dominik Leichtle, Sorbonne University
Luka Music, Quandela
Harold Ollivier, French Institute for Research in Computer Science and Automation

Secure multi-party computation (SMPC) protocols allow several parties that distrust each other to collectively compute a function on their inputs. In this paper, we introduce a protocol that lifts classical SMPC to quantum SMPC in a composably and statistically secure way, even for a single honest party. Unlike previous quantum SMPC protocols, our proposal only requires very limited quantum resources from all but one party; it suffices that the weak parties, i.e. the clients, are able to prepare single-qubit states in the X-Y plane. The novel quantum SMPC protocol is constructed in a naturally modular way, and relies on a new technique for quantum verification that is of independent interest. This verification technique requires the remote preparation of states only in a single plane of the Bloch sphere. In the course of proving the security of the new verification protocol, we also uncover a fundamental invariance that is inherent to measurement-based quantum computing.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Quantum VerificationDelegated ComputationSecure Multi-Party ComputationDistributed Quantum Computing
Contact author(s)
t kapourniotis @ warwick ac uk
ekashefi @ inf ed ac uk
dominik leichtle @ lip6 fr
luka music @ quandela com
harold ollivier @ inria fr
2023-03-16: approved
2023-03-15: received
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Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike


      author = {Theodoros Kapourniotis and Elham Kashefi and Dominik Leichtle and Luka Music and Harold Ollivier},
      title = {Asymmetric Quantum Secure Multi-Party Computation With Weak Clients Against Dishonest Majority},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/379},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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