Paper 2023/377
FuLeeca: A Lee-based Signature Scheme
, Technical University of Munich, Technical University of Munich, Technical University of Munich, Technical University of Munich, Technical University of Munich, Technical University of MunichAbstract
In this work we introduce a new code-based signature scheme, called FuLeeca, based on the NP-hard problem of finding low Lee-weight codewords. The scheme follows the Hash-and-Sign approach applied to quasi-cyclic codes of small Lee-weight density. Similar approaches in the Hamming metric have suffered statistical attacks, which reveal the small support of the secret basis. Using the Lee metric we are able to thwart such attacks. We use existing hardness results on the underlying problem and study adapted statistical attacks. We propose parameters for FuLeeca and compare them to the best known post-quantum signature schemes. This comparison reveals that FuLeeca is extremely competitive. For example, for NIST category I, i.e., 160 bit of classical security, we obtain an average signature size of 276 bytes and public key sizes of 389 bytes. This not only outperforms all known code-based signature schemes, but also the signature schemes Dilithium, Falcon and SPHINCS+ selected by NIST for standardization.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Post-Quantum CryptographySignature schemeCode-Based CryptographyLee metric
- Contact author(s)
-
stefan ritterhoff @ tum de
georg maringer @ tum de
sebastian bitzer @ tum de
violetta weger @ tum de
patrick karl @ tum de
t schamberger @ tum de
jonas schupp @ tum de
antonia wachter-zeh @ tum de - History
- 2023-03-16: approved
- 2023-03-15: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/377
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/377,
author = {Stefan Ritterhoff and Georg Maringer and Sebastian Bitzer and Violetta Weger and Patrick Karl and Thomas Schamberger and Jonas Schupp and Antonia Wachter-Zeh},
title = {FuLeeca: A Lee-based Signature Scheme},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/377},
year = {2023},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/377}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/377}
}
