Paper 2023/298
Hardening Signature Schemes via Derive-then-Derandomize: Stronger Security Proofs for EdDSA
, University of California San DiegoAbstract
We consider a transform, called Derive-then-Derandomize, that hardens a given signature scheme against randomness failure and implementation error. We prove that it works. We then give a general lemma showing indifferentiability of Shrink-MD, a class of constructions that apply a shrinking output transform to an MD-style hash function. Armed with these tools, we give new proofs for the widely standardized and used EdDSA signature scheme, improving prior work in two ways: (1) we give proofs for the case that the hash function is an MD-style one, reflecting the use of SHA512 in the NIST standard, and (2) we improve the tightness of the reduction so that one has guarantees for group sizes in actual use.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- A major revision of an IACR publication in PKC 2023
- Keywords
- SchnorrEdDSAindifferentiabilitySHA-512SHA-256signature schemes
- Contact author(s)
-
mbellare @ ucsd edu
h3davis @ ucsd edu
zidi @ stanford edu - History
- 2023-02-28: approved
- 2023-02-27: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/298
- License
-
CC0
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/298,
author = {Mihir Bellare and Hannah Davis and Zijing Di},
title = {Hardening Signature Schemes via Derive-then-Derandomize: Stronger Security Proofs for {EdDSA}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/298},
year = {2023},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/298}
}
