Paper 2023/223
Classical and Quantum Security of Elliptic Curve VRF, via Relative Indifferentiability
Abstract
Verifiable random functions (VRFs) are essentially pseudorandom functions for which selected outputs can be proved correct and unique, without compromising the security of other outputs. VRFs have numerous applications across cryptography, and in particular they have recently been used to implement committee selection in the Algorand protocol. Elliptic Curve VRF (ECVRF) is an elegant construction, originally due to Papadopoulos et al., that is now under consideration by the Internet Research Task Force. Prior work proved that ECVRF possesses the main desired security properties of a VRF, under suitable assumptions. However, several recent versions of ECVRF include changes that make some of these proofs inapplicable. Moreover, the prior analysis holds only for *classical* attackers, in the random-oracle model (ROM); it says nothing about whether any of the desired properties hold against *quantum* attacks, in the quantumly accessible ROM. We note that certain important properties of ECVRF, like uniqueness, do *not* rely on assumptions that are known to be broken by quantum computers, so it is plausible that these properties could hold even in the quantum setting. This work provides a multi-faceted security analysis of recent versions of ECVRF, in both the classical and quantum settings. First, we motivate and formally define new security properties for VRFs, like non-malleability and binding, and prove that recent versions of ECVRF satisfy them (under standard assumptions). Second, we identify a subtle obstruction in proving that recent versions of ECVRF have *uniqueness* via prior indifferentiability definitions and theorems, even in the classical setting. Third, we fill this gap by defining a stronger notion called *relative indifferentiability*, and extend prior work to show that a standard domain extender used in ECVRF satisfies this notion, in both the classical and quantum settings. This final contribution is of independent interest and we believe it should be applicable elsewhere.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. CT-RSA'23
- Keywords
- Verifiable random functionsECVRFpost-quantum securityQROMindifferentiabilityFiat-Shamirnon-malleability
- Contact author(s)
-
cpeikert @ alum mit edu
xujiay @ oregonstate edu - History
- 2023-02-20: approved
- 2023-02-18: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/223
- License
-
CC BY-NC-SA
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/223, author = {Chris Peikert and Jiayu Xu}, title = {Classical and Quantum Security of Elliptic Curve {VRF}, via Relative Indifferentiability}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/223}, year = {2023}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/223} }