Paper 2023/215
Formally verifying Kyber Episode IV: Implementation Correctness
, Universidade do Minho, INESC TEC, University of Porto (FCUP), INESC TEC, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy, IMDEA Software, Université Côte dAzur, French Institute for Research in Computer Science and Automation, Université de Lorraine, French National Centre for Scientific Research, French Institute for Research in Computer Science and Automation, Université Côte d’Azur, French Institute for Research in Computer Science and Automation, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy, Universidade do Minho, INESC TEC, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy, Radboud University NijmegenAbstract
In this paper we present the first formally verified implementations of Kyber and, to the best of our knowledge, the first such implementations of any post-quantum cryptosystem. We give a (readable) formal specification of Kyber in the EasyCrypt proof assistant, which is syntactically very close to the pseudocode description of the scheme as given in the most recent version of the NIST submission. We present high-assurance open-source implementations of Kyber written in the Jasmin language, along with machine-checked proofs that they are functionally correct with respect to the EasyCrypt specification. We describe a number of improvements to the EasyCrypt and Jasmin frameworks that were needed for this implementation and verification effort, and we present detailed benchmarks of our implementations, showing that our code achieves performance close to existing hand-optimized implementations in C and assembly.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published by the IACR in TCHES 2023
- Keywords
- High-assurance cryptographylattice-based KEMsNIST PQCJasminEasyCrypt
- Contact author(s)
-
jba @ di uminho pt
mbb @ fc up pt
gilles barthe @ mpi-sp org
benjamin gregoire @ inria fr
vincent laporte @ inria fr
jean-christophe lechenet @ inria fr
tiago oliveira @ mpi-sp org
hpacheco @ fc up pt
miguel quaresma @ mpi-sp org
peter @ cryptojedi org
antoine sere @ protonmail com
pierre-yves @ strub nu - History
- 2023-04-24: revised
- 2023-02-17: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/215
- License
-
CC0
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/215,
author = {José Bacelar Almeida and Manuel Barbosa and Gilles Barthe and Benjamin Grégoire and Vincent Laporte and Jean-Christophe Léchenet and Tiago Oliveira and Hugo Pacheco and Miguel Quaresma and Peter Schwabe and Antoine Séré and Pierre-Yves Strub},
title = {Formally verifying Kyber Episode IV: Implementation Correctness},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/215},
year = {2023},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/215}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/215}
}
