Paper 2023/1931
Single-Trace Side-Channel Attacks on CRYSTALS-Dilithium: Myth or Reality?
Abstract
We present a side-channel attack on CRYSTALS-Dilithium, a post-quantum secure digital signature scheme, with two variants of post-processing. The side-channel attack exploits information leakage in the secret key unpacking procedure of the signing algorithm to recover the coefficients of the polynomials in the secret key vectors
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Dilithiumpost-quantum digital signaturekey recovery attackside-channel attacklattice reduction
- Contact author(s)
-
ruize @ kth se
kngo @ kth se
jgartner @ kth se
dubrova @ kth se - History
- 2023-12-21: approved
- 2023-12-20: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1931
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1931, author = {Ruize Wang and Kalle Ngo and Joel Gärtner and Elena Dubrova}, title = {Single-Trace Side-Channel Attacks on {CRYSTALS}-Dilithium: Myth or Reality?}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1931}, year = {2023}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1931} }