Paper 2023/1889

Fully Parallel, One-Cycle Random Shuffling for Efficient Countermeasure against Side Channel Attack and its Complexity Verification.

Jong-Yeon Park, Samsung (South Korea)
Dongsoo Lee, Samsung (South Korea)
Seonggyeom Kim, Samsung (South Korea)
Wonil lee, Samsung (South Korea)
Bo Gyeong Kang, Samsung (South Korea)
Kouichi Sakurai, Kyushu University
Abstract

Hiding countermeasures are the most widely utilized techniques for thwarting side-channel attacks, and their significance has been further emphasized with the advent of Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms, owing to the extensive use of vector operations. Commonly, the Fisher-Yates algorithm is adopted in hiding countermeasures with permuted operation for its security and efficiency in implementation, yet the inherently sequential nature of the algorithm imposes limitations on hardware acceleration. In this work, we propose a novel method named Addition Round Rotation ARR, which can introduce a time-area trade-off with block-based permutation. Our findings indicate that this approach can achieve a permutation complexity level commensurate with or exceeding $2^{128}$ in a single clock cycle while maintaining substantial resistance against second-order analysis. To substantiate the security of our proposed method, we introduce a new validation technique --Identity Verification. This technique allows theoretical validation of the proposed algorithm's security and is consistent with the experimental results. Finally, we introduce an actual hardware design and provide the implementation results on Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC). The measured performance demonstrates that our proposal fully supports the practical applicability.

Note: In accordance with IEEE publication policies, we will remove the paper from the e-print archive. The paper has been officially published in the "IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing".

Metadata
Available format(s)
-- withdrawn --
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Permutation
Contact author(s)
pjy8499 @ gmail com
dsdsdsds lee @ samsung com
sgyeom kim @ samsung com
wonil01 lee @ samsung com
bogyeong kang @ samsung com
sakurai @ inf kyushu-u ac jp
History
2024-10-09: withdrawn
2023-12-08: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1889
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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