Paper 2023/1876
Thwarting Last-Minute Voter Coercion
Abstract
Counter-strategies are key components of coercion-resistant voting schemes, allowing voters to submit votes that represent their own intentions in an environment controlled by a coercer. By deploying a counter-strategy a voter can prevent the coercer from learning if the voter followed the coercer’s instructions or not. Two effective counter-strategies have been proposed in the literature, one based on fake credentials and another on revoting. While fake-credential schemes assume that voters hide cryptographic keys away from the coercer, revoting schemes assume that voters can revote after being coerced. In this work, we present a new counter-strategy technique that enables flexible vote updating, that is, a revoting approach that provides protection against coercion even if the adversary is able to coerce a voter at the very last minute of the voting phase. We demonstrate that our technique is effective by implementing it in Loki, an Internet-based coercion-resistant voting scheme that allows revoting. We prove that Loki satisfies a game-based definition of coercion-resistance that accounts for flexible vote updating. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first technique that enables deniable coercion- resistant voting and that can evade last-minute voter coercion.
Note: Appearing in the proceedings of the 45th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy S&P 2024
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P 2024)
- Keywords
- votingcoercion-resistancevote privacyverifiability
- Contact author(s)
-
rosg @ itu dk
mashe @ itu dk
carsten @ itu dk - History
- 2023-12-06: approved
- 2023-12-06: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1876
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1876,
author = {Rosario Giustolisi and Maryam Sheikhi Garjan and Carsten Schuermann},
title = {Thwarting Last-Minute Voter Coercion},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1876},
year = {2023},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1876}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1876}
}
