A note on ``HAKECC: highly efficient authentication and key agreement scheme based on ECDH for RFID in IOT environment''

Zhengjun Cao

Paper 2023/1771

A note on ``HAKECC: highly efficient authentication and key agreement scheme based on ECDH for RFID in IOT environment''

Zhengjun Cao

Abstract

We show that the Nikooghadam-Shahriari-Saeidi authentication and key agreement scheme [J. Inf. Secur. Appl., 76, 103523 (2023)] cannot resist impersonation attack, not as claimed. An adversary can impersonate the RFID reader to cheat the RFID tag. The drawback results from its simple secret key invoking mechanism. We also find it seems difficult to revise the scheme due to the inherent flaw.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info: Preprint.
Keywords: Authentication Anonymity Key agreement Internet of Things
Contact author(s): caozhj @ shu edu cn
History: 2023-11-17: approved; 2023-11-16: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2023/1771
License: CC0

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1771,
      author = {Zhengjun Cao},
      title = {A note on ``HAKECC: highly efficient authentication and key agreement scheme based on ECDH for RFID in IOT environment''},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1771},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1771}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1771}
}