Paper 2023/1745

New Public-Key Cryptosystem Blueprints Using Matrix Products in $\mathbb F_p$

Remi Geraud-Stewart, Qualcomm (United States)
David Naccache, École Normale Supérieure - PSL
Abstract

Given a set of matrices $\mathbf{A} := \{A_0, \dotsc, A_{k-1}\}$, and a matrix $M$ guaranteed to be the product of some ordered subset of $\mathbf{L}\subset\mathbf{A}$, can $\mathbf{L}$ be efficiently recovered? We begin by observing that the answer is positive under some assumptions on $\mathbf{A}$. Noting that appropriate transformations seem to make $\mathbf{L}$'s recovery difficult we provide the blueprint of two new public-key cryptosystems based upon this problem. We term those constructions "blueprints because, given their novelty, we are still uncertain of their exact security. Yet, we daringly conjecture that even if attacks are found on the proposed constructions, these attacks could be thwarted by adjustments in the key generation, key size or the encryption mechanism, thereby resulting on the long run in fully-fledged public-key cryptosystems that do not seem to belong to any of the mainstream public-key encryption paradigms known to date.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Public-key cryptosystemMatrix groupNon-commutative cryptography
Contact author(s)
rgerauds @ qti qualcomm com
david naccache @ ens fr
History
2023-12-04: last of 5 revisions
2023-11-11: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1745
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1745,
      author = {Remi Geraud-Stewart and David Naccache},
      title = {New Public-Key Cryptosystem Blueprints Using Matrix Products in $\mathbb F_p$},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1745},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1745}
}
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