Paper 2023/1709

Signal Leakage Attack Meets Depth First Search: an Improved Approach on DXL Key Exchange Protocol

Abstract

In 2012, Ding, Xie and Lin designed a key exchange protocol based on Ring-LWE problem, called the DXL key exchange protocol, which can be seen as an extended version of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. In this protocol, Ding et al. achieved key exchange between the communicating parties according to the associativity of matrix multiplications, that is, $(x^T\cdot A)\cdot y = x^T\cdot (A\cdot y)$, where $x,y$ are column vectors and $A$ is a square matrix. However, the DXL key exchange protocol cannot resist key reuse attacks. At ESORICS 2022, Qin et al. proposed a method that an adversary can recover the reused private key after forging the public keys for several times. Nevertheless, Qin et al.'s method leads to a lot of redundant operations. In this paper, we improve Qin et al.'s method to a more general case and propose an effective approach to combine signal leakage attacks with depth first search. Compared with state-of-the-art result appeared at ESORICS 2022, the number of reused private key have been decreased from 29 to 10. In other words, if the number of reuses exceeds 10, the private key will be restored. Moreover, we validate the effectiveness of the results through experiments.