Paper 2023/1696
A note on ``a novel authentication and key agreement scheme for Internet of Vehicles''
Abstract
We show that the Yang et al.'s key agreement scheme [Future Gener. Comput. Syst., 145, 415-428 (2023)] is flawed. (1) There are some inconsistent computations, which should be corrected. (2) The planned route of a target vehicle is almost exposed. The scheme neglects the basic requirement for bit-wise XOR, and tries to encrypt the route by the operator. The negligence results in some trivial equalities. (3) The scheme is insecure against impersonation attack launched by the next roadside unit.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- AuthenticationAnonymityImpersonation attackKey agreementInternet of vehicles
- Contact author(s)
- caozhj @ shu edu cn
- History
- 2023-11-03: approved
- 2023-11-02: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1696
- License
-
CC0
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1696,
author = {Zhengjun Cao},
title = {A note on ``a novel authentication and key agreement scheme for Internet of Vehicles''},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1696},
year = {2023},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1696}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1696}
}
